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Fife: The National Boxing Commission Act of 2001: It's Time for Congres

NOTE
THE NATIONAL BOXING COMMISSION ACT OF
2001: IT'S TIME FOR CONGRESS TO STEP INTO
THE RING AND SAVE THE SPORT OF BOXING
I.

INTRODUCTION

On July 2, 2001, Beethavean Scottland, a professional boxer, died
after sustaining severe brain injuries during a June 26, 2001 match held
aboard the U.S.S. Intrepid in New York City.' After the match,
allegations surfaced that the event was held with improper emergency
equipment, Scottland was overmatched by his opponent, and the New
York State Athletic Commission was inexperienced in the field of
boxing and improperly staffed.2 Only three months earlier, on March 9,
2001, a professional boxing match in Erlanger, Kentucky left former
world heavyweight champion Greg Page, age forty-two, with permanent
brain damage.' Some medical experts feel that, had Page's bout taken
place in another state, he may not have received medical clearance to
box. These two incidents illustrate the fact that, in addition to the risks
posed by their opponent, professional boxers face other possibly
preventable safety risks when they enter the ring. In addition to these
safety problems, boxing is also plagued by unethical business practices
that threaten the integrity of the sport. Given these problems, boxing is
1. See J.K. Dineen, Boxer Loses 6-Day Fight,N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 3, 2001, at 3.
2. See Tim Smith & Dave Saltonstall, The Anatomy of a Fighter's Death: Critics Slam
State's Panel and Oversight, N.Y. DAILY NEws, July 29, 2001, at 4. The New York State Athletic
Commission has denied these allegations. See Corky Siemaszko, Agency Defended in Death of
Boxer, N.Y. DAILY NEwS, July 30,2001, at 15.
3. See Tim Smith, PageFightingfor Life, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 11, 2001, at 58.
4. One such expert is Flip Homansky, a former ringside physician and current member of the
Nevada Athletic Commission. Homansky believes that Page would have been looked at much more
closely if the bout took place in Nevada, as boxers in Nevada over the age of thirty-six must
undergo specialized medical exams before getting clearance to box. See Royce Feour, Homanskys
Opinionon Aging Boxers Should Be Heard, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Mar. 17,2001, at 7C.
5. See Boxing and Federal Laws: Hearing on Reform of Professional Boxing Industry
Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter
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in need of a set of rules and regulations that are uniformly enforced
throughout the sport.
Boxing is currently the only major professional sport in the United
States that is not governed by a central body, league, or association.6
Individual state boxing commissions have been the only form of
organization and regulation in the sport and there has been no consistent
level of regulation among the state commissions. 7 The federal
government has tried to respond to this problem with the passage of the
Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996 ("Safety Act")' and the
Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act ("Ali Act").' Neither of these
regulations took the step of creating a central federal authority, instead
they still leave oversight of the sport to the states.
As a response to the problems that plague boxing, Senators Harry
Reid and John McCain have introduced the National Boxing
Commission Act of 2001 ("Boxing Commission Act").'Y The purpose of
this Note is not to say that this legislation would have definitely
prevented the death of Beethavean Scottland or the injuries suffered by
Greg Page. Such a claim would be too speculative. Instead, this Note
argues that the establishment of a National Boxing Commission would
lead to the creation and enforcement of a uniform set of safety rules,
which in turn would lessen the chance of such tragic incidents from
reoccurring. A national commission with enforcement powers would
also be able to curb the use of the unethical business practices that
pervade the sport of boxing today.
Part II of this Note begins with a discussion concerning the present
day structure of the sport, including the roles played by promoters,
sanctioning organizations, and state boxing commissions. Part Ill of the
Note looks at the history of federal regulation in the sport. Specific
attention will be given to the Safety Act and the Ali Act." The
weaknesses of each of these reforms will also be addressed. Part IV
Hearings on Reform of Professional Boxing] (statement of Patrick C. English, Esq., General
Counsel for boxing promoter Main Events).
6. See id. (statement of Sen. McCain, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. &
Transp.).
7. See id.
8. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6313 (2001).
9. See id. These two pieces of legislation were enacted separately, but are now codified
together.
10. See S. 893, 107th Cong. (2001) (finding that boxing is beset with wide-ranging problems,
including exploitation of boxers, conflicts of interest, questionable judging, and corruption). Senator
McCain has since introduced a similar piece of legislation to reform the sport of boxing, the
Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2002. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
11. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6313 (2001).
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examines the Boxing Commission Act. Section A contains an overview
of the proposed bill and discusses how certain provisions can remedy
many of the problems set forth in the previous section of the Note.
Section B considers whether the Boxing Commission Act itself is
constitutional. Section C discusses policy arguments in favor of passage
of the Boxing Commission Act. Part V then suggests additional
provisions that should be included as part of the Act. The analysis
concludes that the Boxing Commission Act should be enacted, as a
federal commission is the best way to establish a long-lasting framework
for regulation and enforcement of standards in safety and business
practices in the sport of boxing.
II.

BACKGROUND: THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF BOXING

In order to understand the problems surrounding boxing, it is
important to look at the current structure of the sport and the various
roles different parties play in that structure. When a boxing match is
held, particularly a title bout, there are usually four major parties
involved: (1) the boxer, (2) the promoter, (3) the sanctioning body, and
(4) the state's boxing commission.'2 This Part explains the role that each
of these parties has in the sport.
A. Boxers
To a casual observer of the sport, it may seem that professional
boxers as a whole are a group of overpaid athletes. The facts actually
show a much different story. Many boxers come from impoverished
backgrounds.' 3 They get involved in boxing in order to escape their4
surroundings and chase down the dream of a million dollar purse.
However, in reality, boxing is a sport where only a handful of the boxers
actually15 wind up reaching their dreams and earning large sums of
money.
Many fighters retire without any type of savings or with significant
physical and mental damage.' 6 Even boxers who earn large purses from a
12. See Hearings on Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 105th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Hearings on Ali Act-1999] (statement
of Gregory P. Sirb, then President, Ass'n of Boxing Commissions ("ABC")).
13. See Justin Brown, Downfor the Count?, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Aug. 24, 2001, at 13.

14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. For instance, one of the greatest boxers in the history of the sport, Joe Louis,
retired broke. See id.; see also Evan Kanew, Darkness Visible: Boxer Gerald McClellan, Blind and
Brain Damaged, Leaves Home, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 13, 2002, at 25 (noting that former
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fight often never see anything close to the actual purse, as they usually
give up about half their earnings to managers, trainers, and licensing
fees. Greg Page, the former heavyweight champion of the world, is
common example of a boxer who, despite his success, was in financial
ruin.' 7 Page, who earned $500,000 when he won the championship in
1984, was boxing for a purse of only $1500 when he fought the fight
8 The world of
that left him permanently brain damaged in March 2001 .'
"blue-collar boxing," where boxers travel from town to town, supporting
families on earnings as little as $400 a fight, is much more common in
the sport than the championship bouts for million-dollar purses.' 9
B. Promoters
The relationship between a boxer and a promoter is usually a very
complex business arrangement 0- Most boxers have managers that handle
their business affairs and negotiations in return for a percentage of the
boxer's purse for each bout.2 ' The boxer and manager then try to
negotiate contracts with a promoter, who can guarantee to provide bouts
at a certain dollar amount in exchange for exclusive promotional rights
to the fighter.- The promoter pays all the expenses associated with
promoting the bout, thus he or she assumes the financial risk for each
fight.23 The less money a promoter can get
a boxer to accept, the more
24
potential profit available to the promoter.
Obviously, the promoter also stands to gain more when one of the
boxers they have under contract is a champion or a top-ranked boxer.
Often the desire of a promoter to obtain contracts with these boxers can
lead to some questionable business practices.25 One such example is the
World Boxing Council ("WBC") middleweight champion Gerald McClellan was left without
insurance, savings, or pension following a brain injury he suffered in a 1995 bout, despite a thirtyfour bout career and two-year title reign).
17. See Deborah Hastings, Page Should've Closed the Book, TIMES UNION (Albany), Apr. 15,
2001, at E8.
18. See id.
19. Seeid.
20. See Scott Baglio, Note, The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act: The First Jab at
EstablishingCredibility in ProfessionalBoxing, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 2260-62 (2000).
21. Seeid. at 2260-61.
22. See id. at 2260.
23. See id. at 2261.
24. See id. at 2262.
25. See Thom Loverro, Muhammad Ali Reform Act Hasn't Done Much Reforming, WASH.
TIMEs (D.C.), May 24, 2001, at B10 (quoting Patrick C. English, Esq., who stated "[liawlessness in
the contractual aspects of the sport is as egregious as I have seen in 20 years. Contracts-legitimate
arm's length contracts-mean nothing").
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recent contract dispute regarding the rights to promote former
heavyweight champion Hasim Rahman, which eventually wound up in
litigation. 6 On May 9, 2001, Rahman signed a promotion agreement
with Don King and in return Rahman received $200,000 cash and a $4.8
million check as a signing bonus.27 Rahman's previous promoter, Cedric
Kushner Promotions, Ltd. ("CKP"), claimed that Rahman was still under
contract with CKP.n The court ruled that because of an injury provision
in the contract,29 CKP still had the contractual right to promote
Rahman's next bout. 0 Although this could have just simply been a
contract dispute, it illustrates the complexities that exist in promotion
agreements and the sometimes-questionable lengths promoters like King
may go to in order to secure an agreement with a top-ranked boxer.
C. Sanctioning Organizations
The sanctioning body becomes involved in the process when a
boxer holding one of its titles is involved in a championship bout."
There are currently over a dozen major sanctioning organizations in the
world, most of which are headquartered outside of the United States.32
The three major sanctioning bodies are the World Boxing Association
("WBA"), the World Boxing Council ("WBC"), and the International

Boxing Federation ("IBF"). 33
In addition to sanctioning title bouts, the sanctioning bodies rank
the top fighters in each weight class.T The top rankings are extremely
precious to a boxer because they determine which boxers get big-money
bouts and opportunities to fight for the championship. 35 The ranking

26. See Lewis v. Rahman, 147 F. Supp. 2d. 225,227 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
27. See id. at 232.
28. See id. at 227.
29. The contract period extended past the expiration date for any period of time for which
Rahman was injured and unable to box. See id. at 235.
30. See id. at 236.
31. See Hearings on Ali Act-1999, supra note 12 (testimony of Greg Sirb, then President,
ABC).
32. See Brown, supranote 13.
33. See Steve Springer & David Wharton, Boxing's Credibility Takes Another Hit as
Sanctioning Bodies' Methods for Determining Big-Money Fights Come Under Scrutiny, L.A.
TamES, May 18, 1999, at Dl.
34. See Hearingson Ali Act-1999, supra note 12 (testimony of Greg Sirb, then President,

ABC).
35. See Springer & Wharton, supranote 33.
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systems used by the various sanctioning bodies have often come under
attack because the criteria for rankings are too subjective.36
The legitimacy of rankings is also often questioned due to the fact
that several promoters have admitted to bribing sanctioning organization
officials in order to secure better rankings for their boxers.37 Bob Arum,
one of boxing's top promoters, admitted during the bribery trial of
former IBF head Bob Lee that he once made a $100,000 pay-off to Lee. 8
These pay-offs result in the sale of a deceptive product to the public, as
rankings are based on bribes rather than the ability of the boxers.3 9 Aside
from the deceptive nature of the rankings to the public, rankings that are
not actually based on talent and skill exploit boxers and risk their safety.
A promoter who bribes a sanctioning organization to advance a boxer of
average skill in the rankings, jeopardizes the safety of that boxer by
creating a situation where the boxer could find himself in a mismatch
against a boxer of superior skill. The sanctioning organization profits
financially from the bribe and the promoter profits from the increased
revenue a bout with a higher ranked opponent brings. However, it is the
boxers that are exploited. Their safety is at risk for no financial gain of
their own, as the promotion contract previously establishes the amount
of their purse regardless of the opponent.4°
Sanctioning bodies have also come under criticism for their
ignorance in preparing the rankings of boxers. 4' For example, last year
the World Boxing Organization ("WBO") ranked a dead fighter, super
middleweight Darrin Morris, and then proceeded to advance him into the
top six in a subsequent ranking. The fact Morris actually advanced in
the rankings exemplifies the lack of care and review used when
sanctioning bodies rank boxers. The end result is that when a ranking is
not based on actual skill, there is a potential for mismatches that may
expose a boxer to unnecessary health and safety risks.
36. See id. The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act ("Ali Act"), which is currently in force,
does require the sanctioning organizations to make their criteria for rankings public, it does not
specify the criteria that the sanctioning organizations must use. See infra note 95 and accompanying
text.
37. See Springer & Wharton, snpra note 33.
38. See John Whisler, A Fighting Chance: Bob Arum Says Boxing's Mexican-American
Fanbase is the Best Hope to Save a Dying Sport, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, June 11, 2001, at
1C.
39. See id.
40. See supranotes 23-25 and accompanying text.
41. See Tim Graham, A Goofi Change for a Goofy Sport, ESPN Boxing, (Aug. 7, 2001),
available at http://www.espn.go.com/boxing/columns/graham/1236284.html (last visited July 22,
2002) (on file with author).
42. See id.
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D. State Boxing Commissions
The state boxing commission is the only party that has the legal and
legislative authority to regulate a boxing event.43 State boxing
commissions from across the country are loosely organized under the
Association of Boxing Commissions*' ("ABC"), an organization of
forty-six state and tribal boxing commissions located throughout the
United States.45 Despite the presence of the ABC, state boxing
commissions still lack uniformity and consistency among one another. 6
Perhaps the most glaring example of the lack of uniformity among
the state commissions is Mike Tyson's attempt to obtain a boxing
license for a June 8, 2002, bout with heavyweight champion Lennox
Lewis. The ABC had requested that none of its members grant Tyson a
license due to his violent and criminal activity outside the ring and his
violent and unsportsmanlike conduct inside the ring.47 Nevada, Texas,
Colorado, West Virginia, and Georgia all followed the ABC and refused
to license Tyson.4 ' However, fellow ABC members Tennessee, the
eventual site of the bout, and Washington, D.C.49 agreed to license
Tyson.0 The ability of Mike Tyson to forum shop for a license
symbolizes the lack of uniformity among the state commissions."

43. See Hearings on Ali Act-1999, supra note 12 (testimony of Greg Sirb, then President,
ABC).
44. A more detailed explanation of the role of the ABC can be found at its homepage,
http://vvw27.brinkster.comabcboxing/Home.asp (last visited July 23, 2002).
45. See Federal Regulation of Boxing: HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci.
and Transp., 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Hearingson FederalRegulation of Boxing] (statement
of Tim Lueckenhoff, President, ABC) (noting that this organization has tried to push for uniform
creation and enforcement of rules within the sport, but that ultimately this effort has been hampered
by a lack of funding and authority).
46. See id. For a further discussion related to the problems related to a lack of uniformity
among states, see supraPart II A-B.
47. See Thom Loverro, IBF Says it Will Allow Lewis to Fight Tyson, WASH. TiMEs (D.C.),
Feb. 26, 2002, at C01; Chuck Finder, Pressure Forces West Virginia to Rescind Tyson-Leivis Bid,
Prrr. POST-GAZETrE, Mar. 10, 2002, at B16 (noting that the ABC sent letters to each member state
asking them to follow Nevada's January 26, 2002 decision not to grant Tyson a license).
48. See Finder, supranote 47.
49. See Edward Wong, Tyson Wins License to Fight Lewis in Washington, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar.
13, 2002, atD1.
50. See Richard Sandomir, Going Where Vegas Wouldn't: Memphis Roles the Dice By Taking
the Tyson-Lewis Fight, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2002, at DI.
51. See Hearings on Federal Regulation of Boxing, supra note 45 (testimony of Bert Sugar,
boxing historian) (noting that license shopping is not a new phenomenon, as in 1914, former
heavyweight champion Bob Fitzsimmons was twice denied a license at age fifty by the New York
State Supreme Court, yet two days later he went over the border and fought in the state of
Pennsylvania when that state granted him a license).
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State boxing commissions have also come under attack in some
states for being run by boards who are inexperienced with the sport of
boxing and often only hold their job for political reasons. 2 Senator John
McCain has said "'[g]enerally speaking, [state] boxing commissions are
used by governors as a place to give political awards. A large number of
boxing commissioners wouldn't know a boxing glove from a catcher's
mitt."' 53 In New York, several members of the New York State Athletic
Commission have been linked to campaign contributions to the
Republican Party and to current New York Governor George Pataki.4
Marc Ratner, Executive Director of the Nevada State Athletic
Commission, admits that there is no question that the five-person
commission in Nevada that is appointed by the governor is a vehicle for
political appointments. 5
Recently, several examples indicating inexperienced or improperly
staffed state commissions have come to light.5 ' In Kentucky, Nancy
Black, the executive director of the Kentucky Athletic Commission, the
agency that oversees the regulation of boxing in that state, said "[o]n
boxing itself, I can't say that I'm an expert. 5 7 Ms. Black did not even
attend her first professional fight until two weeks after Greg Page
suffered brain damage as a result of a match held in that state. 8 In Ohio,
two doctors who examined boxers for the state and worked as ringside
physicians for several years within the state were found to have been
practicing medicine without licenses. 9 In addition, it was claimed by one
of the alleged physicians that the state commission did not review
doctors' qualifications, and as a result veterinarians and chiropractors
52. See Brown, supra note 13 (quoting Sen. McCain about the problems related to state
boxing commissions).
53. Id.
54. See Smith & Saltonstall, supra note 2. The father of New York State Athletic
Commissioner Marc Comstein has contributed over $75,000 to Pataki's campaigns over the years;
Commission Chairman Mel Southard's former law firm had contributed $5600 to Pataki and the
Republican Party while Southard was working for the firm; Commission Attorney Larry Madelker,
who is also an attorney for the State Republican Party, donated $5000 to the Republican Committee;
Commission special assistant, James Polsinello, had contributed more that $27,000 to Pataki's
inaugural fund since 1994; and Commissioner Jerry Becker, a key backer of Pataki's 1994 and 1998
campaigns, has contributed over $2000 to the Conservative Party since 1999.
55. See Symposium, Boxing at the Crossroads,11 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 193, 229 (2001)
[hereinafter Symposium] (statement of Marc Ratner).
56. See Smith & Saltonstall, supra note 2.
57. Hastings, supranote 17 (quoting Nancy Black, Kentucky Athletic Commission Executive
Director).
58. See id.
59. See Joe Maxse, Two Ringside 'Physicians' Not Licensed, Panel Learns, PLAIN DEALER,
May 9, 2001, at IA.
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had routinely medically supervised events in that state., The inadequate
and improper staffing of state commissions not only risks the safety of
boxers, but also allows for corruption by promoters and sanctioning
organizations to go unchecked.
III.

PRIOR FEDERAL REGULATION

The first substantial federal intervention in the sport of boxing took
place in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the Senate looked into
breaking up parts of the sport that were apparently controlled by
organized crime.6' Since then, Congress has introduced numerous pieces
of legislation focused on resolving the problems that plague boxing.
Recently, Congress was successful in enacting two of these attempts: the
Safety Act and the Ali Act.63 These two pieces of legislation have
created some improvements, but glaring problems still remain in the
sport. 4 This section analyzes the two regulations in terms of what they
were intended to accomplish and where they have been unsuccessful.
A.

The ProfessionalBoxing Safety Act

1. History
The Safety Act was designed to create minimum safety standards
inside the ring that would make boxing a "safer and better sport, and
serve to protect the athletes who sustain this industry with their skill,
dedication, and courage."' The legislation sought to strengthen health
and safety precautions for boxers and protect their welfare. 66 The
legislation was especially aimed at protecting the boxers that are out of
the media spotlight and box for little more than a few hundred dollars a
bout in order to make a living.67 These boxers are often subject to
excessive punishment, dangerous mismatches, and rarely receive the
benefit of any health or safety precautions.63

60. See id.
61. See Symposium, supranote 55, at 219 (statement of Patrick C. English, Esq.).
62. For a discussion of legislation that failed to be enacted, see April R. Anderson, Comment,
The Punch That Landed: The ProfessionalBoxing Safety Act of 1996, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 191,
194-98 (1998).

63. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6313 (2001).
64. See Loverro, supra note 25.
65. 141 CONG. REC. S16514 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1995) (statement of Sen. McCain).
66. See id.

67. See id.
68. See id.
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The Safety Act contains several major provisions that were
designed to achieve its aims. First, all boxing events or matches are
required to be supervised by a state boxing commission.69 Second, each
boxer must register with a state boxing commission and receive an
identification card identifying any health or safety disclosures they may
have. 70 Third, all commissioners and promoters must honor the medical
suspensions of boxers that have been ordered by other state
commissions.7' Commissioners must also promptly share the results of
an event they supervised with the other state commissioners. 2 Fourth, no
boxing match may be held unless a physical examination of the boxer,
certifying that he or she is fit to safely compete, is completed and an
ambulance or medical personnel including appropriate resuscitation
equipment and a doctor are on site at the event. 73 Lastly, promoters must
provide each boxer with health insurance to cover any injuries sustained
during the fight.74
2. Weaknesses
Unfortunately, the Safety Act has not achieved all of its goals. It
lacks the strength to do so because it is constructed with vague language
that leaves much of the decision-making regarding safety to the states.
For example, the Safety Act only requires that a state ensure that there is
"a physical examination of each boxer by a physician certifying whether
or not the boxer is physically fit to safely compete.' 75 As a result of
vague language like this, safety standards within the sport can vary from
state to state. Boxers may be considered physically unable to box in one
state, yet cleared to box in another, since states have different standards
for defining what it means to be "physically fit to safely compete."
For instance, New York and New Jersey require that, prior to
licensing, a boxer must undergo a CAT scan or MRJ of the brain.76
Nevada makes no specific requirement regarding diagnostic testing of
the brain, but instead states that physicians may chose to require that a
69. See 15 U.S.C. § 6303(a) (2000). A state without a boxing commission wishing to hold a
match must obtain supervision from a state that has a boxing commission. See id.
70. See id. § 6305(a)-(c).
71. See id. § 6306 (a)(2). This provision has resulted in the creation of a National Suspension
List. This list can be found at http://www.sportsnetwork.com/default.asp?c=sportsnetwork&page
=boxing/stat/suspension l.htm.
72. See id. § 6307.
73. See id. § 6304(1)-(3).
74. See id. § 6304(4).
75. Id. § 6304(1).
76. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 213.2 (2001); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13.
§ 46-12A.2 (2002).
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boxer undergo any necessary testing.7 In Kentucky, the state holding the
bout where Greg Page was left brain damaged, a medical examination is
required but there is no mention of any requirements related to
diagnostic testing of any kind.78 As a result of these differences, a boxer
who may be denied 79a license in one state can obtain a license in another
and continue to box.
Another example of differences among states in their medical
regulations is in the requirements for medical examinations of older
boxers. In Nevada, any boxer over the age of thirty-six must undergo a
special medical review by the state athletic commission prior to
obtaining a license to box in that state. 0 An even stricter standard is
applied in New Jersey, where a boxer over the age of thirty-five must
demonstrate his capability to a physician before receiving his license.8
However, New York and Kentucky have no additional medical
requirements for older boxers wishing to obtain licenses. These
differences can be traced to the fact that the language of the Safety Act is
too vague and still allows the states the decision to make the
determination of what being "physically able to compete" means.
Even when provisions of the Safety Act are clear, there have been
problems associated with the state commissions and their failure to
properly follow those provisions. For example, Stefan Johnson died
following a bout in New Jersey despite the fact he was supposed to be on
the national suspension list.82 Johnson had suffered a severe knockout
during a bout in Canada and was placed on the suspension list pending
three scheduled medical exams. 3 Despite being on the list, the South
Carolina commission allowed him to box in a subsequent bout. As a
result of that bout, Johnson slipped off of the suspension list and was
assumed reinstated. 4 It was at that point that he took part in the New
77. See NEV. ADMiN. CODE ch. 467, § 027 (2001).
78. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 229.111 (Michie 2001).
79. For instance, former champion and Olympic gold medalist Meldrick Taylor, who some
doctors feel is suffering from brain damage caused by repetitive head trauma, has been refused a
license in New Jersey and avoided bouts in Nevada and Georgia due to those states' requirements of
neurological exams. See Mike Fish, Quitting Time: Against Advice, E-champ Meldrick Taylor
Fights On, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 3, 2002, at 22. Yet, Taylor has still been able to continue to
box in states like Alabama, a state which has no boxing commission. See id.
80. See NEV. ADMIN. CODE ch. 467.017 (2001).
81. See N.J. ADMmN. CODE tit. 13 § 46-5.2 (2002).
82. See Symposium, supra note 55, at 224 (statement of Jerry Izenberg, sports columnist).
83. See id. (statement of Greg Sirb, former President, ABC and current Executive Director of
the Pennsylvania Athletic Commission). According to Sirb, since Johnson's bout was in Canada,
South Carolina did not need to recognize the suspension, but it is "pretty much common
knowledge" that it should have been. Id.
84. See id. (statement of Jerry Izenberg).
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Jersey bout that cost him his life." The fact that multiple organizations
were in charge of overseeing suspensions led to one agency making an
assumption and following the lead of the previous one. It is possible that
such a tragedy would never have unfolded had one agency, more
experienced with the sport, been empowered to oversee suspensions.
B. The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act
1. History
The Ali Act was created out of the feeling that the Safety Act was
too limited, as it only provided protection for boxers while inside the
ring.86 The drafters of the Ali Act were concerned with eliminating the
unethical, and often illegal, contracts between boxers, promoters, and
managers that existed in the sport, as well as questionable practices in
the refereeing and judging of bouts.87 Senator John McCain proposed the
Ali Act in June 1998, although two Democratic Senators blocked it
when it went to a final vote in 1999.88 Eventually, Congress approved the
Ali Act and it became law on May 26, 2000.89
The Ali Act contains several measures aimed at correcting and
preventing unethical business practices and conflicts of interest in
boxing. It prevents promoters from serving as managers of fighters and
prohibits promoters and managers from having conflicts of interest. 9°
The Ali Act also contains provisions banning what it considers to be
coercive contracts by promoters. 9' Importantly, option contracts,
contracts that grant the promoter exclusive promotional rights to the

85. See id.
86. See Melissa Bell, Legislative Updates, Time to Give Boxers a Fighting Chance: The
Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 473, 477-78
(2000).
87. See id. at 479-84.
88. See Baglio, supra note 20, at 2281 (noting that one of the Senators that blocked the vote
was Harry Reid, who may have been against the Ali Act because of its possible adverse effects on
boxing promoters such as Bob Arum and Don King; two individuals Reid had previously stated
were his two most important constituents).
89. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6313 (2001).
90. See id. § 6308(b)(1)(A)-(B).
91. See id. § 6307b(a)(1)(A). A coercive contract contains:
[A] contract provision that grants any rights between a boxer and a promoter, or between
promoters with respect to a boxer, if the boxer is required to grant such rights, or a
boxer's promoter is required to grant such rights with respect to a boxer to another
promoter, as a condition precedent to the boxer's participation in a professional boxing
match against another boxer who is under contract to the promoter.
Id. § 6307b(a)(1)(B).
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challenger in the event the challenger defeats the champion, are banned
under the Ali Act if they are for longer than twelve months.92 The Ali
Act also calls for the ABC, within two years of enactment of the All Act,
to develop and approve minimum contractual provisions for bout
agreements and boxing contracts. 93 However, "[ilt is [only] the sense of
the Congress that State boxing commissions should follow these ABC
guidelines."94
The All Act also attempted to eliminate some of the credibility
problems associated with the sanctioning organizations. There is a
provision requiring sanctioning organizations to make public their
guidelines and criteria for determining rankings.95 The provision also
mandates that within two years after enactment, the ABC develop and
approve consistent and written criteria for the ratings of professional
boxers. However, once again, the provision states "[ilt is [only] the
sense of the Congress that sanctioning bodies and State boxing
commissions should follow these ABC guidelines." 97
2. Weaknesses
Questions about the overall effectiveness of the Ali Act and the
state of professional boxing prompted Senator McCain to hold
Congressional hearings in May 2001.98 These questions have arisen
because the Ali Act provides assistance to the state boxing commissions
in providing more effective oversight of the sport, but it still leaves
enforcement to the states. 9 Criticism has focused on the fact that some
states simply are not aggressively enforcing the requirements related to
formation of contracts because they do not have the resources or the
willingness to investigate wrongdoings."
States are also still inconsistent in the business regulation of
professional boxing contracts, with contracts valid under the laws of

92. See id. § 6307b(a)(1)(A)(i).
93. See id. § 6307a.
94. Id. This is problematic because, as already indicated, the state boxing commissions have
not had a strong history of following the ABC's directions. See supra notes 46-51 and
accompanying text.
95. See id. § 6307c(c)-(d).

96. See id. § 6307c(a).
97. Id.
98. See Hearings on Reform of Professional Boxing, supra note 5 (statement of Sen.

McCain).
99. See id.
100. See id. (statement of Patrick C. English, Esq.); see also id. (statement of Gregory P. Sirb,
then President, ABC) ("Without proper enforcement these laws are useless.").
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some states but not others.'"' One example of this, which apparently was
not in the headlines, involved a boxer that wanted to break a managerial
contract without any grounds. 02 The New Jersey Athletic Control Board,
("NJACB") which had jurisdiction over the contract, held a full hearing
and found the contract to be valid.' 3 The boxer then fought in another
state that also held the contract valid, but that state commission would
only turn over the manager's share to the NJACB, despite the fact the
NJACB had no mechanism to accept it.' °' To make matters worse, the
boxer fought in a third state that decided not to follow the NJACB
decision at all.' 5 As a result, despite the presence of the Ali Act, full
faith and credit was not being given to a due process hearing that
resulted in a final determination.' °6
Despite the Ali Act, the process for handling bout agreements and
contracts are also still not uniform.'0 7 Even with the elimination of
certain types of option contracts, boxer/manager and boxer/promoter
contracts vary widely and are still not based on one universal form.' 3
Contracts are also not on file in one central location where all parties can
readily obtain information on a particular boxer's contractual situation. ' 09
This makes it especially difficult for a state to review contracts that were
formed and on file in other states.
The Ali Act is apparently weak in other areas as well. The
provision requiring sanctioning organizations to disclose criteria for
their determination of rankings does not go far enough." There is no
requirement that the criteria chosen be rational or objective."' Without
objective criteria, it is impossible to tell if a boxer has advanced in
ranking because of a victory or a bribe. Also, in many cases promoters
and managers have been able to avoid the licensing requirements and,
more importantly, the conflict of interest
regulations of the Ali Act by
' 2
calling themselves "matchmakers." 1

101. See id. (statement of Patrick C. English, Esq.).
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. (statement of Gregory P. Sirb, then President, ABC).
108. See id.
109. See id. (stating that "[t]he current system of how [state] commissions compile and enforce
these contracts is a mess!").
110. See id. (statement of Patrick C. English, Esq.).
111. See id.
112. See id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol30/iss4/5

14

Fife: The National Boxing Commission Act of 2001: It's Time for Congres
20021

THE FEDERAL REFORM OFBOXING

Senator Harry Reid believes that the Ali Act is actually doing what
it was supposed to, but therein lies the problem."' Reid feels the Ali Act
does not go far enough, as "'[i]t was limited to what it was supposed to
do. It dealt in a limited way with fight promoters.'"1 4 As a result of this
limitation, Senators Reid and McCain have introduced the Boxing
Commission Act."'
IV. THE NATIONAL BOXING COMMISSION ACT OF 2001
A.

NationalBoxing Commission Act of 2001: An Overview

The Boxing Commission Act creates a federal commission that
would "prescribe and enforce uniform regulations for professional
boxing in order to protect
the health and safety of boxers and to ensure
' 6
fairness in the sport." "
The Commission is an independent establishment in the executive
branch and is made up of a five-member panel appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." 7 The
members of the Commission are all required to have a background that
supports a "broad understanding" of boxing and its business
relationships."8 This ensures that members of the Commission are
appointed on grounds that are not just purely political and that they have
the experience to handle all matters related to boxing. To further
eliminate the Commission as being a place to reward political loyalty,
the Commission requires that no more than three Commission members
may be of the same political party." 9 Conflicts of interest within the

113. See Royce Feour, Reid Puts IncreasedClout Behind Fed Role in Ring, LAS VEGAS REV.
J., June 2, 2001, at 3C.
114. Id.
115. See id. Since the introduction of this bill, another bill has been introduced in Congress to
reform the sport of boxing. The Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2002 is a bill to amend the
Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996 ("Safety Act"), and to establish the United States Boxing
Administration, a federal agency to oversee the sport. See H.R. 5006, 107th Cong. (2002). An
identical Senate bill is supported by John McCain. See 148 CONG. REc. S4705, 4721 (May 22,
2002) (statement of Sen. McCain). The Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2002 is similar in
almost every way to the National Boxing Commission Act of 2001 ("Boxing Commission Act"),
but it does not include regulation of cable television networks, an issue that McCain and Reid have
apparently become divided over. See Tony Batt, Senators Divided on Best Way to Improve Boxing,
LAS VEGAS REV. J., Aug. 1, 2002, at 3B.
116. S.893, 107th Cong. § 3 (2001).
117. See id. § 5(a)-(b)(1).
118. Seeid. §5(b)(3)(A).
119. Seeid. §5(b)(4).
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sport are also eliminated, as no member of the Commission is allowed to
serve a role in the sport or earn money from the sport in any capacity.' 20
At least one member of the Commission must be an expert in the
field of medicine and at least one member must be a former member of a
local boxing authority.12 ' Having a medical expert ensures that
provisions pertaining to the physical safety of boxers are comprehensive
and are written with precise medical terms. 22 As a result, it is likely that
the vague terms that currently exist in many state regulations will be
eliminated. In addition, including at least one member from a former
local boxing authority, along with other provisions of this Boxing
Commission Act,'" ensures that the Commission is familiar with and
respects the rights of the state boxing commissions.
The Commission supervises all the participants in the sport of
boxing and keeps track of them through licensing and registration
requirements.'24 The Boxing Commission Act requires that boxers,
referees, judges, managers, promoters, matchmakers, sanctioning
organizations, trainers, physicians, cut men, and any "other person
determined by the Commission as performing a professional role in
'
boxing" must be either licensed or registered with the Commission.2
All licensed boxers and boxing personnel are then listed in a national
computerized registry.126 The licensing and registry requirements
eliminate the loopholes that some promoters and managers have used to
get around provisions of the Ali Act,'2' since the registry will make it
obvious when a manager is trying to serve as a promoter or avoid
regulations by calling themselves a "matchmaker." The registry also
ensures that the Commission will have the necessary information to be
alerted to bouts that are obvious mismatches and could possibly result in
120. See id. § 5(b)(5). In addition, the Boxing Commission Act requires a geographic balance
among members of the Commission. See id. No more than three members of the Commission may
be from states either east or west of the Mississippi River. See id.
121. See id. § 5(b)(3)(B).
122. The Boxing Commission Act requires the Commission to draft the regulations regarding
the health and safety of boxers. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
124. See S. 893, 107th Cong. § 7 (2001).
125. Id. § 7(b)(1). Boxers, judges, referees, and boxing officials must apply for licenses that are
renewed on an annual basis. See id. § 7(a). Promoters, matchmakers, sanctioning organizations,
managers, trainers, physicians, cut men, or any other persons serving professional roles in boxing
must register with the Commission every three years. See id. § 7(b).
126. See id. § 8(a). A boxer's listing in the registry must contain their medical records; results
of medical testing; the boxing matches in which the boxer has participated, including the date of
each match, the outcome, and whether any medical assistance was necessary; their won-lost record;
their height and weight; and business associates they have. See id. § 8(a)(1)(A)-(D).
127. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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a risk to one boxer's safety. Finally, a national licensing and registration
system eliminates the ability of boxers to go forum shopping for a
boxing license.
The Commission is required to create one set of standards related to
the safety of participants, physical examinations of boxers, medical
services at events, and boxing equipment. 2 1 Importantly, under the
Boxing Commission Act, Congress does not set the medical standards
themselves. The Boxing Commission Act could have just made the
Commission an agency that would enforce medical regulations created
by Congress, but instead it is the Commission that prescribes the
regulations and standards. This allows the Commission to make use of
the expertise that they possess in both medicine and boxing. The
Commission will likely set national standards in many areas. For
example, the Commission can set national regulations such as requiring
that every licensed boxer undergo a yearly MRI or CAT scan of the
brain, all boxers over the age of thirty-five undergo additional medical
testing prior to licensing, and ringside physicians be qualified
neurological experts.
Another important safety aspect to the Boxing Commission Act is
that it requires the Commission to conduct discussions and enter into
agreements with foreign boxing entities regarding minimum health and
safety standards.' 2 9 Under the current system, state commissions do not
have the unified power or resources to make such agreements. This is
problematic as many American boxers participate in matches all over the
world. Obviously, the Commission would not possess jurisdiction in
foreign nations. However, requiring the Commission to work on
agreements with foreign regulatory agencies makes certain that someone
is looking out for a boxer's health and safety interests in foreign bouts.
Such agreements may even be facilitated by the fact that several other
nations, such as Great Britain,'" already have national regulatory bodies.
In an effort to curb unethical business practices, the Commission is
responsible for setting the standards related to formation of contracts
involved in professional boxing; and the Boxing Commission Act
requires that any contract for a match must be filed with the Commission

128. See S. 893, 107th Cong. § 9(a) (2001).
129. See id. § 9(a)(6).
130. The British Boxing Board of Control, a private nonprofit organization, has overseen
British professional boxing since 1929. See British Boxing Board of Control, The Role of the British
Boxing Board of Control in Professional Boxing in this Country, available at
http://%,wvv.bbbofc.com/Role_of_the_board.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) (on file with author).
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some time prior to the match. 3 It also makes the Commission
responsible for regulations and standards applicable to the establishment
3 2
of championship titles, weight classes, and the awarding of rankings.
These provisions should prevent the opportunities for fraud that are
present in the sport. If objective criteria are used to rank boxers, it will
make it much more difficult for a promoter to bribe a sanctioning
organization in return for a higher ranking, as a move up in the rankings
based on a bribe would become more obvious to state and federal
officials. Greater scrutiny of contractual provisions, such as those that
force a winner to relinquish his rights to the loser's promoter, would
lessen the possibility of contracts of adhesion and ensure that deserving
boxers are not denied the opportunity to challenge for a championship.
The enforcement powers given to the Commission will allow the
Commission to be effective in the areas of improving safety and
preventing unethical business practices. The Ali Act has been ineffective
because some states have not been aggressive in enforcing its
provisions.'33 The Boxing Commission Act grants the Commission the
authority to issue suspensions'34 and prohibitory orders, I31 conduct
investigations, 36 seek injunctions, 37 intervene in civil actions,
and

131. SeeS. 893, 107th Cong. § 9(a)(8)(A)-(B) (2001).
132. See id. § 9(a)(9)(A)-(C). The Commission only establishes the standards for the creation
of rankings, and is prohibited from the actual ranking of boxers. See id. § 9(c)(1).
133. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
134. See S. 893, 107th Cong. § ll(a)(1) (2001). The Commission may, after notice and
opportunity for a hearing, suspend or revoke any license or registration issued under the Boxing
Commission Act if it is necessary for the protection of health and safety of a boxer or is otherwise in
the public interest. See id. The Commission may determine the appropriate length of suspension, but
it may not be less than six months. See id. § 11 (a)(2)(A).
135. See id. § 11(b). Reasons for issuing prohibitory orders include a contract, arrangement, or
agreement that does not comply with Commission regulations; a match that is either unlicensed or
in which the participants are unlicensed; a reasonable belief that a match may be affected by
bribery, collusion, intentional losing, racketeering, extortion, the use of unlawful threats, coercion,
intimidation, or violence; undue risk to the health and safety of a boxer's participation in a match; or
the violation of any other regulation in the Boxing Commission Act. See id. § 1l(b)(1). Once notice
is given, regardless if an affected party received the notice, the Commission may then summarily
prohibit a match pending the final outcome of a proceeding. See id. § 1l(b)(2)(A).
136. See id. § 11(c). Investigations may be held to determine if a person has violated, or is
about to violate, any provisions of the Boxing Commission Act. See id. § 1 (c)(1)(A). The refusal
of a party to cooperate with an investigation is a misdemeanor criminal offense and can be
punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000, or imprisonment for a term of no more than one year.
See id. § 11 (c)(3)(D).
137. See id. § I 1(c)(5). If the Commission determines that a person is engaged or about to
engage in an activity that constitutes a violation of the Boxing Commission Act, they may bring an
action in the appropriate court for injunctive relief. See id.
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conduct hearings.' With one body uniformly enforcing regulations,
instead of each state, the Boxing Commission Act should be more
successful at enforcement than the state commissions. Under the current
system it is inevitable that there will be communication gaps between
the patchwork of state commissions, as well as differences on how each
state enforces provisions of the Safety Act and the Ali Act.' 4 Simply put,
these communication gaps and differences will not exist under a central
authority. Also, the criminal penalties associated with the failure to
cooperate in a Commission investigation 4' ensure that the boxing
community will take the Commission's authority seriously.
The Boxing Commission Act also provides that state commissions
wishing to enact more stringent provisions will still have the authority to
do so and the Commission will not interfere with the operations of the
state boxing commissions as long as they meet the requirements of the
Boxing Commission Act.142 The Act only maintains a floor that every
state must abide by. States are still free to set a higher ceiling of
regulation. Therefore, states like Nevada, who have expressed concerns
about the Boxing Commission Act, will not see their authority infringed
upon. The co-existence of state commissions and the National
Commission will make the National Commission stronger because states
may be able to alert the National Commission about a local problem that
has the potential to develop into a national one.
Additionally, no less than eighteen months after the enactment of
the Boxing Commission Act, state and tribal Indian boxing agencies
must submit a "local boxing plan" that meets the requirements of the
Boxing Commission Act to the Commission.' 43 On the opposite end,
before prescribing regulations or establishing standards, the Commission
must first consult with local commissions." 4 The cooperation of the state
and federal government in creating each other's plans will ensure that
the most comprehensive regulations possible are created. The states will
also have a say in how the Commission creates federal standards.
Therefore, the state standards will only then need to meet the federal
standards the states themselves helped to create. Politically, these
138. See id. § 11 (d). On behalf of the public interest, the Commission may intervene as right
under Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in any civil action relating to professional
boxing filed in a United States District Court. See id. § Il(d)(1).
139. Seeid.§ ll(e).
140. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
142. See S. 893, 107th Cong. § 13(a)-(b) (2001).
143. See id. § 12(a).
144. See id. § 10.
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provisions may be beneficial in easing opposition by certain states and
limiting the possibility that a state commission would question the
constitutionality of the Boxing Commission Act.
B.

Constitutionalityof the Boxing Commission Act

Despite the proposed advantages the Boxing Commission Act may
bring, there is a possible argument that the Act itself is unconstitutional.
To date, there have been no constitutional challenges to either the Safety
Act or the Ali Act.' 45 However, state boxing commissions have already46
expressed concern over the creation of a federal boxing commission.
Therefore, there is a possibility that either a state, or perhaps a boxing
promoter, would bring a constitutional challenge against the creation of
a National Boxing Commission.
Congress has the power "[to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."14 7 As
a result, if boxing as a whole is characterized as interstate commerce,
Congress has the authority to regulate it. The Supreme Court has spoken
about boxing as it relates to interstate commerce on one prior occasion. 141
In International Boxing, the Court held that boxing promotion did
qualify as interstate commerce and that professional boxing is not
exempt from the Sherman Antitrust Act. 49 However, in International
Boxing the Court was specifically looking at whether promoters who
promoted "professional championship boxing contests on a multistate
basis, coupled with the sale of rights to televise, broadcast, and film the
contests for interstate transmission" constituted interstate commerce
within the meaning of the Constitution. "°
The question surrounding the constitutionality of the Boxing
Commission Act is different because this Act deals with the sport of
boxing on a whole, not just the promotion of major televised boxing
145. For an interesting discussion about constitutional concerns related to the constitutionality
of the Safety Act, see Anderson, supra note 62, at 206-09, which indicates that since Colorado had
no state boxing commission when the act was passed, it could be argued that the statute was
unconstitutional, as it forces states without commissions to submit to the supervision of another
state if they want to hold a boxing event.
146. See Royce Feour, Connission Objects to Federal Body, LAS VEGAS REV. J.,June 16.
2001, at 8C (indicating that the Nevada boxing commission objects to a federal commission because
they feel it may supercede and negatively impact Nevada's commission; see also Brown, supranote
13, at 16 (quoting an anonymous official of the New York State Boxing and Wrestling Commission
as saying '"There is very strong opposition [to a federal commission] on the part of the states.'").
147. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
148. See generally United States v. Int'l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
149. See id. at 241-43.
150. Id. at 240.
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events. 5' Only a very small percentage of professional boxing matches
are actually the high profile championship matches that are seen on
television. 52 The majority of bouts the Commission would be regulating
would be local, non-televised, or club fights. The Court in International
Boxing did not address the question of whether these types of local
events would also be considered interstate commerce and, as such,
subject to federal regulation. A commission that only regulated major
championship bouts would almost surely be constitutional but it would
also be pointless, as it is crucial that federal regulation of boxing is
designed to create "uniform health and safety standards and other
initiatives reach local industry activities where arguably the risk of
injury is greatest."'53
In response to a constitutional challenge, there is a view that even
the smallest local boxing event can be considered interstate commerce."'
Since a boxer's advancement is based on rankings that are primarily
affected by a win-loss record, every fight, whether highly promoted,
televised or not, can potentially impact his or her ranking."' In order to
increase his or her professional standing, a boxer is then likely to travel
from state to state in an attempt to expand his or her opportunities to
fight.'56 Therefore, even local professional bouts have an impact on the
interstate aspects of the sport. "Additionally, 'the frequent use of
interstate commerce to circumvent many states' regulatory schemes is
persuasive evidence that the inadequacy of current health safeguards in
professional boxing at all levels of competition is a problem of national
scope."" 57
This line of reasoning seems to fall within the broad view the
Supreme Court has taken with regard to the Commerce Clause. In
UnitedStates v. Lopez, the Supreme Court stated that "[w]here economic
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating
151. The Boxing Commission Act defines the term "boxing match" as "a professional boxing
match, or any part of such a match, that is held within the United States. The term does not include
an amateur boxing match." S.893, 107th Cong. § 4(1) (2001). This term is much broader than the
scope of boxing as analyzed in InternationalBoxing. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
152. See Hearings on Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 104th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter Hearingson All Act-1998] (statement
of Walter Stone, General Counsel, IBF) (stating that less than five percent of the bouts that occur in
the country are championship bouts).
153. Peter E. Millspaugh, The Federal Regulation of Professional Boxing: Will Congress
Answer the Bell?, 19 SErON HALL LEGIS. J. 33, 44 (1994).
154. See Anderson, supranote 62, at 207.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. Id. at 207-08.
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that activity will be sustained."'58 In the case of local boxing matches,
each individual bout can have a substantial affect on the parts of the
sport that involve interstate activity.'5 9 Further, the Supreme Court has
also held that Congress can regulate and protect the instrumentalities,
persons, or things in interstate commerce, even though a threat may
come only from intrastate activities.' 6°
Additional support for the constitutionality of the Boxing
Commission Act comes from the fact that the Supreme Court has
recognized that even activities that are "purely intrastate" in character
can nevertheless be regulated if they "'directly affect interstate and
foreign commerce."",161 In Perez, the Court upheld the power of Congress

to criminally punish intrastate extortionate credit transactions, as this
type of loan sharking provides organized interstate crime "with its
second most lucrative source of revenue."' 62 In a similar fashion,
intrastate boxing is the backbone or base to the structure of interstate
boxing. Intrastate boxing develops the participants and the fan support
that make interstate events so financially lucrative and popular.
Therefore, despite the fact the Boxing Commission Act regulates
intrastate boxing as well as interstate boxing, it appears that the
arguments supporting the constitutionality of the Act fall more into line
with the Supreme Court's recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
C. The Boxing CommissionAct: A Policy Perspective
In addition to constitutional concerns about the Boxing
Commission Act, it is likely the Act will face strong opposition from
those that believe the federal government should not play a role in the
regulation of sports. However, several policy arguments support the
need for the federal government to take a more aggressive role in
boxing.
Boxing is a multi-million dollar industry' 63 and problems with the
sport can have a tremendous impact on consumers. Boxing fans pay high
prices to view the sport both in person and on television. For example,
the previously mentioned June 8, 2002, heavyweight championship bout
158. 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
159. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
160. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000).
161. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971).
162. Id.
163. See Baglio, supranote 20, at 2260 n.18 (stating that a 1997 bout between Mike Tyson and
Evander Holyfield grossed $120 million in one night, which is equal to the movie Titanic playing
for four weeks on 2000 movie screens).
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between Lennox Lewis and Mike Tyson at the Pyramid in Memphis,
Tennessee, had ticket prices as high as $2,400 a seat.' 64 The expected
gross revenue for the Pyramid was fifteen times more than the arena's
previous highest-grossing event.' 65 Almost two million people purchased
the bout on pay-per-view at a cost of $54.95, leading to a record $103
million in television revenue.' 66 Besides direct pay-per-view purchasers,
many cable and satellite television consumers also indirectly pay for
boxing when they purchase other programming, as HBO and Showtime
budget a combined $100 million annually for their boxing telecasts.' 67
These high prices paid by consumers obviously lead to enormous
revenues, but they also mean that corruption in boxing can have a
tremendous financial impact on consumers and fans alike.
Recently, purchasers of the pay-per-view event between Mike
Tyson and Evander Holyfield brought suit against Tyson "claim[ing]
they were entitled to view a 'legitimate heavyweight title fight' fought
'in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations' of the
governing boxing commission."'' 8 The match grossed over $100 million
in one night, because of pay-per-view technology. 9 Instead of a
legitimate boxing match, Tyson bit a piece of Holyfield's ear off and the
match ended in a disqualification. The court denied the plaintiffs relief,
as they had no legal basis for their claim'7 Although the plaintiffs were
unsuccessful in Castillo, the case does illustrate the impact of the sport's
lack of credibility among consumers. If rankings are being bought,
judges are being bribed, or matches are being fixed, a legitimate
argument can then be made that in those instances, consumers are being
fraudulently deceived. Therefore, in order to ensure consumer
protection, there needs to be a central authority that can enforce rules
preventing possible corruption.

164. See Sandomir, supranote 50.
165. See id.
166. See Richard Sandomir, Lewis-Tyson Bout Provides a Knockout Revenue Figure, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 2002, at D4 (noting that, by contrast, the one day record for a film that had recently
been set by "Spider-Man," was less than half of the amount grossed by the Lewis-Tyson pay-perview sales).
167. See Jack Newfield, The Shame of Boxing, NATION, Nov. 12,2001, at 13.
168. Castillo v. Tyson, 701 N.Y.S.2d 423,424 (App. Div. 2000).
169. See Newfield, supra note 167, at 13.
170. See Castillo, 70 N.Y.S.2d at 425. The court found that the plaintiff's claims of breach of
contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, breach of
express and implied warranties, tortuous interference with contractual relations, wantonness, fraud,
and negligent representation all lacked merit. See id. at 424. Despite the plaintiffs lack of a
legitimate legal claim, the fact they pursued litigation is an indicator that consumers question the
credibility of the sport.
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In addition to consumers, professional boxers themselves also need
the protection that the Boxing Commission Act would offer. Most
boxers are not earning millions of dollars in high-profile championship
bouts. 17 1 Instead many are journeymen boxers, out of the glare of the
media, who are subject to excessive punishment and injury at poorly
supervised events. 7 1 In addition, the majority of boxers are minorities
who come from economically disadvantaged backgrounds, which has
led some to call boxing the "the sport of the underclass."' 73 For this
reason society has often had a tendency to overlook the cheating and
injuries that are associated with boxing. 74 This Act can help to eliminate
this mindset and guarantee all boxers the same protection that boxers
participating in a high-profile bout in Las Vegas would receive.
Further support for the Boxing Commission Act can be found in the
fact that federal intervention into sports is not a new phenomenon. In
fact, history shows that the federal government has previously been
successful in regulating other sports because of concerns similar to those
in boxing today. The federal government currently regulates interstate
wagering in the sport of horse racing. 7 These regulations are designed
to promote cooperation among the states in the acceptance of legal
interstate wagers. 7 6 Similarly, boxing not only lacks cooperation among
the states, but uniformity. The federal government has also intervened in
the past to protect the health and safety of players in sports with
inadequate private regulation. 177 President Theodore Roosevelt, disturbed
by the brutality in collegiate football, began a reform movement in 1905
to create a uniform set of rules and establish a broader range of penalties
in order to reduce the rates of injury and death in football. 7 8 Although it
did not involve direct federal legislation or control, Roosevelt's initiative
was so successful that many major aspects
of today's football had their
7
1906.'
in
developed
rules
the
from
origins

171. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
172. See 141 CONG. REC. S16514 (daily ed. Nov. 1,1995) (statement of Sen. McCain).
173. Newfield, supra note 167, at 15 (quoting Lou DiBella, a Harvard Law School graduate
and advocate of boxing reform, who formerly ran HBO boxing).
174. See id.
175. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3007 (2001).
176. See 15 U.S.C. § 3001 (2001).
177. See Anderson, supra note 62, at 208.
178. See id.
179. See id.
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V.

SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

A.

Alternate Dispute Resolution Provision

In order to lessen the use of litigation in boxing and allow boxers to
obtain quick resolution of contract disputes, the Boxing Commission Act
should include a provision that either establishes or encourages the
establishment of an arbitration or alternative dispute resolution system.
Generally a boxer's career is brief, only spanning a few years due to the
demanding physical nature of the sport.5 Contract disputes that wind up
in litigation can be devastating to a boxer's career earning potential, as
until the litigation is resolved the boxer is usually prevented from
participating in bouts. Unfortunately, boxers often find themselves in the
courtroom.'' Conceivably, there are also many boxers with contract
disputes that do not pursue litigation either because they could not risk
the loss of time in the ring or they lacked the financial means to
commence litigation. Therefore, it is necessary for boxers to have a
viable remedy for resolving these disputes.
The Boxing Commission Act should include or promote the
formation of an arbitration or alternative dispute resolution plan similar
to the types already utilized by other sports. Major League Baseball
("MLB"), the National Football League ("NFL"), the National
Basketball Association ("NBA"), and the National Hockey League
("NHL") all utilize some form of grievance or salary arbitration system
in order to resolve disputes.' 2 These sports have been successful in
implementing arbitration systems because, unlike boxing, each one of
these sports has a player's union."' Although the presence of a player's
union has made it easier for those sports to implement an arbitration
system, boxing should still try to follow their example.

180. See Steve Greenfield & Guy Osbom, A Gauntletfor the Glove: The Challenge to English
Boxing Contracts, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 153, 169 (1995).
181. See Hearings on Ali Act-1998, supra note 152 (statement of Sen. Richard H. Bryan)
(stating that "[t]he relationships that exist between boxers, promoters, managers, and sanctioning
bodies is often so muddled that some boxers spend more time fighting in court than they do in the
ring"). For some recent examples, see Lewis v. Rahman, 147 F. Supp. 2d 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
Remick v. Manrfredy, 238 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2001); and Lewis v. Don King Productions., 94 F. Supp.
2d 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
182. See Frederick N. Donegan, Examining the Role of Arbitration in Professional Baseball, 1
SPORTS LAW. J. 183, 189 (1994) (noting that all of these sports have an arbitration system for
grievances and all but the National Basketball Association have a salary arbitration system as well).
183. See id. at 199.
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MLB is thought to have the best and most developed arbitration
system in professional sports.' Salary arbitration was bargained for in
baseball in 1973. 85' The system is used to determine salaries for players
with between three and six years of major league service that are unable
to reach a salary agreement for the upcoming season with their
respective team.16 In the baseball system, each side presents final salary
figures to an impartial arbitrator.' 7 Arbitrators are selected from lists of
potential arbitrators submitted by both the Major League Baseball
Players' Association and the owners' Player Relations Committee. 8 The
arbitration hearing is held privately and consists of a one-hour
presentation by each side with an additional half hour for each side to
present a rebuttal and summation.'89 The arbitrator then makes his or her
choice of which offer to accept by using criteria that is set forth in the
collective bargaining agreement.' 9° A decision is usually rendered within
twenty-four hours.'9'
Although the situations for which arbitration would be used in92
boxing would be different than the situations it is used in for baseball,
boxing could benefit from the use of the procedural framework utilized
in baseball. It would be possible to require all boxers and promoters to
sign agreements to arbitrate their disputes when they apply for their
license and registration.' 93 The agreement would specify the arbitration
rules and identify the criteria to be used by the arbitrator. Boxers and
promoters would then need to notify the Commission of their intent to
arbitrate and disputes would be heard before an arbitrator or panel of
arbitrators. A window for arbitration already exists in all cases, as the
Boxing Commission Act already requires that a copy of the contract for
any match must be filed with the Commission some time before the
match.' 94 Just as the members of the Commission are, the arbitrators

184.
185.

See id. at 198.
See Jonathan M. Conti, The Effect of Salary Arbitration on Major League Baseball, 5

SPORTS LAW.

J. 221, 222 (1998).

186. See id.
187. See id. at 228-29.
188. Seeid. at229.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. Seeid. at 230.
192. Major League Baseball's system is only for salary-arbitration cases, while a system in
boxing would be mainly focused on resolving contractual disputes between boxers, promoters, and
managers.
193. The Supreme Court has upheld the congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987).
194. See S. 893, 107th Cong. § 9(a)(8)(B) (2001).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol30/iss4/5

26

Fife: The National Boxing Commission Act of 2001: It's Time for Congres
2002]

THE FEDERAL REFORM OF BOXING

should be required to be knowledgeable about the sport and unbiased.9
As with baseball, the procedures should call for a short hearing that
results in the rendering of a quick decision. This would ensure a timely
and fair resolution to all contract disputes within the sport.
Nevada currently makes use of an arbitration system in boxing"
that may also be a useful blueprint for a plan on a national level. The
Nevada law is not mandatory, but it allows for contracts between boxers
and managers to provide for voluntary binding arbitration of disputes by
the Nevada Athletic Commission, pursuant to the Uniform Arbitration
"
Act. 97
' The chairman of the Commission appoints a representative of the
Commission to serve as an arbitrator in the matter.'9 The process has
been successful, especially for boxers, as they have been able to resolve
disagreements with their managers in an expeditious manner.'9 9 Boxers
also receive protection from the possibility that a manager could
pressure them in business dealings by intentionally tying up their career
by filing of a lawsuit.2° In addition, both sides receive the benefit of a
quick and economic resolution of their disputes.'O
B. Pension/MedicalInsuranceProvision
In addition to an alternative dispute resolution provision, it is
important for the Boxing Commission Act to contain some type of
mandatory insurance and pension plan. As currently proposed, one of the
Commission's "[r]equired functions" is to "[e]ncourage the
establishment of a life, accident, and health insurance fund for
professional boxers., 20 2 This provision is poorly constructed, as despite
the Commission being "required" to act in this area, the fact they are
only required to "encourage" allows for the possibility that insurance
and pension provisions will never be established.20 3 Therefore, this
portion of the Boxing Commission Act must be strengthened. Congress
195. See id. § 5(b)(3)(C).
196. See NEv. ADMIN. CODE ch. 467.102(4) (2002).
197. Seeid.
198. See id.
199. See Hearings on Reform of Professional Boxing, supra note 5 (statement of Kirk D.
Hendrick, Chief Deputy Attorney General for the State of Nevada).
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. S.893, 107th Cong. § 9(a)(4) (2001).
203. It should be noted that the Commission is required, within one year of the effective date of
the Boxing Commission Act, to submit a special report to Congress on the feasibility of establishing
a pension system for professional boxing. See id. § 19. This Note takes the position that a pension
system is not only feasible, but should be mandatory. See supra notes 200-02 and infra note 204 and
accompanying text.
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should either specifically establish a detailed insurance and pension plan,
or mandate that the Commission is "required to establish" such a plan
within a given time frame, such as one year.2°
A plan by Congress should first include the establishment of a
mandatory insurance plan that covers all boxers. Medical and life
insurance providing coverage for the possibility of injuries and/or death
suffered during a boxer's career should be established. Second, any plan
must include the establishment of a pension plan. A pension plan is
necessary to limit the pressure some boxers feel to keep fighting at the
end of their career in order to reach financial stability. 5 It is always
difficult to get a boxer to quit, 2° but eliminating the need to keep boxing
in order to earn money would help. A guarantee of some money at the
end of a boxer's career may also eliminate the attitude in the boxing
community that boxers should be given "every opportunity" by officials
and referees to win because money is at stake.
One proposal on how to set up a pension system is to have a
pension system for boxers that includes a health plan and death
benefits. 20 ' Any boxer who has been active for four years, or has had
twenty bouts, should qualify for the system. 2°9 This provision would
probably be successful as boxers can become vested in the plan after
reaching fairly reasonable requirements that make it unlikely a boxer
would need to hang around the sport just to obtain the benefits.
Importantly, this proposal does not attach any age requirement to
become vested in the pension plan. An age requirement, especially one
that went beyond the age of thirty-five, would not be a good decision as
it would encourage boxers to continue to box to an age when their
medical risks become more significant. If fighters, promoters, cable
television networks and casinos agreed to allocate just two percent of the

204. The Commission may be more suited to take on the role of creating these plans, as they
will have the boxing and medical knowledge that would be necessary to tailor a plan suited for the
needs of boxing. Just as the Commission's role in creating standards for physical and mental
examinations of boxers is mandatory, Congress should look to make the creation of a pension and
insurance plan mandatory in order to ensure their eventual creation.
205. For example, Meldrick Taylor continues to box despite the possible onset of brain
damage. See Fish, supra note 79.
206. See Dineen, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting Bruce Silverglade, President of Gleason's Gym in
Brooklyn).
207. See id.
208. See Newfield, supra note 167, at 21 (arguing for the creation of a "Bill of Rights" in
boxing that would, among other things, establish a national commission and set up a pension plan
for boxers).
209. See id.
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revenue from major bouts, an endowment for the plan could be
2 °
established.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Boxing will always be a violent sport that poses risks of injuries to
the athletes that compete in it. There will also always be the opportunity
for some type of corruption no matter what regulatory steps are initiated.
However, the unnecessary safety risks and the blatant corruption in the
sport must come to an end. The Boxing Commission Act would be a
serious step towards accomplishing these goals because it would create
one set of minimum standards for the sport and ensure that these
standards are enforced uniformly across the nation.
As with most federal regulatory legislation, the most compelling
argument against the Boxing Commission Act may simply be that the
taxpayer's money can be better spent elsewhere and that boxing should
simply regulate itself.21' History has demonstrated, however, that selfregulation or organization is not going to take place in boxing.2 2 It is up
to Congress to step in, and at the very least, establish the framework for
a central authority. Once successful, it may be possible for the federal
government to step back from the day-to-day operations of the
Commission and simply act as a monitor on its activity, handing control
over to an independent league or agency.21 If the Commission were
successful in restoring the image of boxing, there would likely be a large
increase in corporate sponsorship and revenue, 2t4 which would make a
small tax on boxing revenues more agreeable to the boxing community.
A tax of this nature could then help to fund a private independent
210. See id.
211. The Commission may generate some funding through its own activities, as the Act does
allow the Commission to "charge fees for the licensing and registration" of boxing personnel. S.
893, 107th Cong. § 7(d) (2001). The "sanctioning organizations and promoters" are required to "pay
the largest portion of the fees," and boxers the smallest possible fees. Id. § 7(d)(3)(B)-(C).
Additional funding would still be required, as the total amount collected in fees cannot exceed ten
percent of the total budget of the Commission's fiscal year. See id. § 7(d)(2). In order to generate
additional funding, it would be possible for Congress to levy taxes on the sport, such as an event
tax, which would allow the sport of boxing to be responsible for funding its own commission.
212. See id. § 2 (stating that "boxing is not successfully regulated by a private entity, and there
is no prospect for meaningful self-regulation").
213. See Baglio, supra note 20, at 2296-97 (concluding that the best solution for the problems
faced by boxing would be a private solution, including the formation of an independent league and a
boxers union).
214. See Symposium, supra note 55, at 218-19 (interviewing Max Kellerman, boxing
commentator for ESPN2) (stating that since Las Vegas has tightened its regulation of the sport, it
has seen increased corporate sponsorship of boxing events).
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commission and accomplish the goals of the legislation at a much lower
cost to taxpayers. In any event, the first step in offering much needed
protection to boxers and consumers alike is for Congress to answer the
bell and pass the Boxing Commission Act.
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